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A Cure for Every Ill?
Remedies for “Pathological” Arbitration
Clauses
HAROUT J. SAMRA & RAMYA RAMACHANDERAN*
Defective arbitration and dispute resolution clauses—
widely called “pathological clauses”—may undermine parties’ intent to seek recourse to arbitration rather than the
courts. Questions concerning the existence and validity of
arbitration clauses are subject to state contract law despite
the wide sweep of the Federal Arbitration Act. This Article
examines selected common “pathologies” and reviews recent court decisions, including from the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals and its constituent federal district courts,
concerning the enforcement of such clauses.
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INTRODUCTION
Carefully drafted dispute resolution clauses in a contract are integral to facilitating transactions between parties but are often neglected in the negotiation process. Parties and their counsel invest
significant time and resources to define their commercial relationship in their agreements, but sometimes fail to give the same care—
or seek expert advice—when crafting a mechanism for resolving
disputes.1 Whether prompted by exhaustion (i.e., “midnight
clauses”) or other influences (i.e., “champagne clauses”),2 poorly
drafted dispute resolution clauses frequently trap parties in a less
than optimal dispute resolution process. In some cases, the clauses
are so poorly drafted that they are internally inconsistent or otherwise suffer from defects that may make them cumbersome or even,
in the worst of scenarios, unenforceable.3 Frédéric Eisemann, the
former Secretary-General of what is today the International Chamber of Commerce’s (“ICC”) International Court of Arbitration, famously—and aptly—called such provisions “pathological.”4
Since his 1974 article on the subject, other scholars have discussed Eisemann’s analysis of arbitration clauses with various errors
or “pathologies” and his assertion that an arbitration clause must fulfill four essential functions: (1) produce mandatory consequences
for the parties; (2) exclude the intervention of State courts in the
settlement of the disputes, at least before the issuance of the award;
(3) give powers to the arbitrators to resolve the disputes likely to
arise between the parties; and (4) implement a procedure which fosters the best conditions of efficiency and speed resulting in a final
award that is susceptible to judicial enforcement.5 These four

1

Nancy Holtz, Beware the Midnight Clause: Hold the Champagne?, JAMS
(Feb.
19,
2016),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/
articles/holtz-insidecounsel.com-beware-the-midnight-clause.pdf.
2
Id.
3
Adam Stone & Kaytie Pickett, When Less Is More: The Dangers of Multiple Inconsistent Arbitration Agreements, ABA (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_construction/2018/fall/arbitration-agreements/.
4
Frédéric Eisemann, La Clause D’arbitrage Pathologique, in COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM EUGENIO MINOLI 129, 129–30 (1974).
5
Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological Clauses: Frédéric Eisemann’s Still Vital
Criteria, 7 ARB. INT’L 365, 366 (1991).
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elements, summarized here, have been used as the guiding principles for users and counsel advising or drafting arbitration clauses.
However, the practice of arbitration cannot be separated from
the context of a domestic legal regime. For instance, while the
United States has a federal policy that favors arbitration, the validity
of arbitration clauses is governed by state contract law.6 This fact
does not conflict with the supremacy of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), which has been repeatedly held to pre-empt any State law
on arbitration.7 As a general matter,
[t]he FAA applies to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes whether or not it is expressly mentioned in that agreement – and is presumed to
preempt the state law selected in a general choice-oflaw provision unless the contract expressly evidences the parties’ clear intent that state arbitration
law applies in place of or in addition to the FAA.8
However, “[w]hen federal courts interpret arbitration agreements, state contract law governs and directs the courts’ analyses of
whether the parties committed an issue to arbitration.” 9 Therefore,
while the FAA governs the arbitration clause, its existence is determined by state law concerning the construction and interpretation of
contracts.10
As we explain below, the Eleventh Circuit, in line with the majority of Circuit Courts, has adopted the integral provision rule to
determine whether a defect in an arbitration clause is so fundamental
to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate that it has the effect of rendering the agreement unenforceable.11 However, how the court has
6

See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017).
Terry L. Trantina, What Law Applies to an Agreement to Arbitrate?, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 29.
8
Id. (emphasis removed); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62–64 (1995).
9
Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1147 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)); see Paladino v. Avnet
Comp. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying “basic principles of contract interpretation in harmony with a general federal policy in favor
of arbitration”).
10
See Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1426.
11
See infra notes 51–55.
7

2020]

A CURE FOR EVERY ILL?

1113

applied the rule raises questions regarding whether it may be applied
more broadly in a consistent and predictable manner.12 This Article
concludes that in light of the integral provision rule, parties should
carefully draft arbitration agreements and avoid boilerplate content
prone to pathological defects that may render the dispute resolution
clause void.
I.

FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION AND THE TEST
USED BY COURTS
U.S. courts were for many years infamous for decisions that
thwarted arbitration agreements between disputants. In many cases,
the courts simply refused to enforce arbitration agreements.13 As a
result, arbitration in the United States faced significant growing
pains, particularly in the early twentieth century.
Initially, courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements, arguing that an agreement to arbitrate refused the right of every “citizen . . . to resort to all the courts of the country.”14 This was coupled
with what is referred to as the “revocability doctrine,” in which the
courts refused to compel arbitration by allowing either party to the
arbitration to revoke its agreement.15 Courts broadly adopted the
view that arbitration—as a process—failed to provide adequate safeguards.16 As a consequence, judges in this era envisioned a more
active role for the justice system to protect citizens’ rights of access
to the courts.17 The consequence of this judicial paternalism,

12

See id.
See generally Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 92 n.4, 97 (2012)
(citing Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 80 So. 466, 467 (Ala. 1918) (an agreement to
arbitrate for disputes from the contract was universally held to be void, as against
public policy); Rison v. Moon, 22 S.E. 165, 167 (Va. 1895) (holding that either
party to an agreement to arbitrate may withdraw from it before the award is rendered)).
14
Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
15
Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L.
REV. 238, 239 (1929).
16
See id. at 242.
17
See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES,
ARBITRATION LAW 22 (2d ed. 2010).
13
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however, was that parties were deprived of contractual autonomy
and agency.
In the face of this judicial skepticism, Congress enacted and
President Coolidge signed the FAA in 1925 to rejuvenate party autonomy by ensuring that agreements to arbitrate were enforced.18
Thus, the first step in the rehabilitation of arbitration in the United
States was to recognize that arbitration agreements were contracts
in themselves and that parties had a right to enforce them as such.
Indeed, the FAA’s purpose is to “quell judicial hostility by mandating that arbitration agreements be enforced on the same footing as
other contracts.”19 As with all things, however, it took decades until
the significance of the FAA was truly felt.20
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that as a matter of federal policy any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.21 To this end, the Court explained
the FAA was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.”22 This clear pro-arbitration policy
has been a hallmark of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the
subsequent decades.23 From this newfound enthusiasm for arbitration, a presumption of “a national policy” in favor of arbitration has
emerged and influences every aspect of arbitration jurisprudence,

18
See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924); see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 114–15 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that legislative history shows that the FAA was enacted to allow the enforcement of ordinary contractual rights).
19
Wilson, supra note 13, at 101 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68–96, at 1 (1924)).
20
See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 403–04 (1967) (holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the
rest of the contract and is subject to independent assessment by the court and introducing the “separability doctrine”).
21
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25–26
(1983).
22
Id. at 24.
23
See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1984); Volt
Info. Sci., Inc., v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53–56
(1995); Hall Street Associates, LL.C v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581–84 (2006);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
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including, as will be seen, the enforcement of arbitration clauses suffering from defects or pathologies.24
The Supreme Court outlined the process courts must undertake
when considering whether to enforce an arbitration provision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc..25
The Court established a two-step inquiry that courts must administer
to determine whether parties must submit the dispute to arbitration
in light of the clause in the contract.26 First, the court must determine
whether the parties agreed for the dispute to be ultimately settled by
arbitration.27 Two pivotal considerations guide this analysis: (1)
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and (2) whether the
dispute falls within the arbitration agreement.28 Second, the court
must analyze whether there are legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement which foreclose the arbitration of claims being
made.29 Thus, the clear federal policy favoring arbitration remains
susceptible to state laws of contract construction to determine the
parties’ intentions, taking into consideration the strong policy in favor of arbitration.30
II.
DRAFTING ARBITRATION CLAUSES
A well-drafted, clear arbitration clause ensures—or at least fosters—efficient dispute resolution and highlights the parties’ clear intention to submit any dispute arising from or related to the agreement to arbitration.31 Indeed, the core purpose of an arbitration
24

See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336–39; Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 65–66 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
25
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also Rivera v. United HealthCare Serv., Inc.,
No. 8:17-CV-1409-T-33TBM, 2018 WL 623677, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2018)
(describing the Supreme Court’s process for determining whether a matter must
be submitted to arbitration).
26
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
27
Id. at 626.
28
Id.; see also Rivera, 2018 WL 623677, at *2 (quoting Fleetwood Enter.,
Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002)).
29
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
30
See, e.g., Delano v. Mastec, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-320-T-27MAP, 2010 WL
4809081, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2010).
31
See Davis, supra note 5, at 365–66; see also, JEFFREY MAURICE
WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 129–
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clause is to clearly communicate the parties’ intention to resolve all
disputes finally through arbitration without recourse to a court of
law on the merits of the dispute.32 This definition is in tune with the
requirements posed by Eisemann.33 Failing this, the agreement is
pathological.34 Scholars and practitioners have identified several
types of pathological arbitration clauses.35 These defects are best
avoided by careful construction before a dispute arises.36 Although
parties have the ability to enter into agreements after a dispute arises,
such a solution is often fraught and subject to new and special considerations of party advantage.37
Generally, arbitration clauses are upheld as valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable unless defeated by “generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”38 As a result,
when faced with a poorly drafted or defective arbitration clause, the
courts must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute notwithstanding the poor drafting of the clause.39 To do so,
courts analyze of all the circumstances surrounding the arbitration
agreement to determine whether the parties both had or should have
had knowledge of the clause, were capable of entering into the
agreement, whether the arbitration agreement suffers

30 (2012) (describing the importance of the language of an arbitration clause and
explaining the essential components of an arbitration agreement); Holtz, supra
note 1 (explaining that carefully drafted arbitration clauses can best meet the
needs and reflect the intentions of the parties to a contract).
32
See Davis, supra note 5, at 366; see also WAINCYMER, supra note 31, at
129–130 (“Arbitration by its essential nature is based on an agreement between
the parties to submit their dispute to binding and final adjudication by an identifiable tribunal.”).
33
See Davis, supra note 5, at 366.
34
See id. at 365–66.
35
See generally John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: Avoiding
the 7 Deadly Sins, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2003, at 29 and passim.
36
See generally Holtz, supra note 1 (explaining the importance of a welldrafted arbitration clause).
37
See, e.g., PIETRO ORTOLANI & DONNA SHESTOWSKY, THE ROLES OF
PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 133–34 (2017) (analyzing the
reasons why post-dispute arbitration agreements are typically disfavored by parties).
38
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
39
See id. at 67–73.
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unconscionability, whether the forum in the agreement is available,
etc.40 The following Section assesses recent decisions by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the district courts located within
the Circuit in which the courts were confronted with the question of
whether to enforce arbitration agreements that suffered from common pathologies, including unavailable fora and non-existing substantive law.
III.

JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF PATHOLOGICAL ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS

A.
Unavailable Forum
In Parm v. National Bank of California, N.A., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with an arbitration agreement
that required parties to arbitrate in an unavailable forum.41 The appellee had entered into a payday loan agreement, which provided for
arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation in
accordance with its consumer dispute rules and the terms of the loan
agreement.42 The arbitration agreement in the contract, in full, provided the following:
Agreement to Arbitrate. You agree that any Dispute,
except as provided below, will be resolved by Arbitration, which shall be conducted by the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer dispute
rules and the terms of this Agreement.
Arbitration Defined. Arbitration is a means of having
an independent third party resolve a Dispute. A “Dispute” is any controversy or claim between you and
Western Sky or the holder or servicer of the Note.
The term Dispute is to be given its broadest possible
meaning and includes, without limitation, all claims
or demands (whether past, present, or future,
40
41
42

See id.
835 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1333.
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including events that occurred prior to the opening of
this Account), based on any legal or equitable theory
(tort, contract, or otherwise), and regardless of the
type of relief sought (i.e. money, injunctive relief, or
declaratory relief). A Dispute includes, by way of example and without limitation, any claim based upon
marketing or solicitations to obtain the loan and the
handling or servicing of my account whether such
Dispute is based on a tribal, federal or state constitution, statute, ordinance, regulation, or common law,
and including any issue concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of this loan or the Arbitration
agreement.
Choice of arbitrator. [ . . . ] [Ms. Parm] shall have
the right to select any of the following arbitration organizations to administer the arbitration: the American Arbitration Association [ . . . ]; JAMS [ . . . ]; or
an arbitration organization agreed upon by you and
the other parties to the Dispute. The arbitration will
be governed by the chosen arbitration organization’s
rules and procedures applicable to consumer disputes, to the extent that those rules and procedures do
not contradict either the law of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe or the express terms of this Agreement
to Arbitrate.43
When the appellee sought to initiate a class action, the appellant
financial institution sought to enforce the arbitration agreement.44
However, the district court declined to do so, finding that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because, in part, it required the
parties to arbitrate in an unavailable forum.45
The court first noted its prior binding precedent, Inetianbor v.
CashCall, Inc.,46 in which the court was faced with a very similar
arbitration provision involving the same financial institution.47 In
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 1333–34.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014).
Parm, 835 F.3d at 1335.
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Inetianbor, the arbitration agreement also called for arbitration
“conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,” but noted that such
arbitration should be in accordance with its “consumer dispute
rules.”48 However, the court concluded that the “consumer dispute
rules” did not exist and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe “does not
authorize Arbitration.”49 Underscoring the latter point, the arbitrator
that CashCall attempted to appoint stated that the agreement was “a
private business deal” and added that “[t]he Tribe has nothing to do
with any of this business.”50
Citing its prior precedent in Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial
Corporation,51 the Inetianbor court analyzed the arbitration agreement in light of the “integral provision rule,” which provides that
the agreement will be rendered unenforceable if an “integral part of
the agreement to arbitrate”—for example, the choice of forum—
fails.52 The court in Inetianbor thus declined to enforce the arbitration agreement, concluding that the parties’ selection of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe as the entity that would resolve the dispute
was integral to their agreement, and that such forum was unavailable.53
In Inetianbor the court noted that while majority of circuits, specifically the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth, followed the integral
provision rule, the rule had been subject to significant criticism in
the Seventh Circuit.54 In Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, the
Seventh Circuit held that, when faced with a failure to select an
available forum, the “[c]ourts should not use uncertainty in just how
[an arbitration] would be accomplished to defeat the evident
choice,” but instead use the power available under § 5 of the FAA
to “supply details in order to make arbitration work” by “appoint[ing] an arbitrator.”55
Notably, the court in Inetianbor distinguished Brown, the very
case in which the Eleventh Circuit first adopted the integral
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1350.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1350 & n.1.
724 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2013).
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provision rule.56 In Brown, the arbitration agreement provided for
binding arbitration “under the Code of Procedure of the National
Arbitration Forum.”57 However, by the time the dispute arose, the
National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) no longer existed.58 Nevertheless, the court concluded that “[t]he unavailability of the NAF does
not destroy the arbitration clause” because there was “no evidence
that the choice of the NAF as the arbitration forum was an integral
part of the agreement to arbitrate” and that this defect, in any event,
could be cured by the court naming the arbitrator pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 5.59 The court in Inetianbor noted that “[t]his case is quite
unlike Brown, where this Court applied the integral provision rule
but permitted substitution pursuant to §5” because, “[i]n Brown, the
arbitration agreement provided for the procedural rules only,”
whereas the agreement in Inetianbor selected “not just the rules of
procedure, but also the arbitral forum.”60
Revisiting this issue in Parm, the court once again applied the
integral provision rule.61 Though the arbitration agreements were
substantially similar, the agreement in Parm also provided “the option to select the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or
JAMS . . . as neutral arbitral fora” to “to administer the arbitration.”62 The court applied the “plain-meaning” rule of contract construction under Georgia law.63 Concluding that the reference to the
AAA and JAMS in the agreement “only provides an administrative
vehicle to appoint the CRST arbitrator and does not affect the importance of the CRST forum in the agreement,” the court noted that
it could not distinguish the agreement from Inetianbor and that the
agreement was, therefore, not enforceable.64

56
57

Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351.
Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir.

2000).
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 1220–21.
Id. at 1222.
Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351.
See Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., 835 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1333, 1335.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1338.
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B.
Non-Existing Substantive Law
In Parnell v. Cashcall, Inc., a plaintiff once again challenged the
validity of the arbitration clause contained in a loan agreement with
Western Sky Financial, LLC that was virtually identical to the arbitration agreements at issue in Parm and Inetianbor.65 In addition to
analyzing the selection of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation
as the forum for the arbitration, the district court also considered the
choice of law provision, which provided that “[t]he arbitrator will
apply the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation and the
terms of this Agreement.”66 Significantly, the court determined that
it was “not clear that the Tribe even has any laws governing the enforceability of contracts.”67 As a result, the court stated that the
plaintiff would be left with “little to no ability to determine what
substantive law would govern the Agreement at an arbitration, even
if the dispute resolution rules of an arbitration organization can govern the conduct of the arbitration proceeding itself.”68 This “contradictory and confusing” language was part of an effort, the court concluded, to “convert a choice of law clause into a choice of no law
clause.”69 The court declined to enforce the arbitration agreement
considering the unavailability of the forum in combination with the
broader unconscionability of the arbitration agreement.70
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to resolving the challenge of
“pathological” arbitration clauses, particularly after Inetianbor,
raises several important questions. First, the practical consequence
of the court’s analysis is difficult to assess beyond the particular circumstances of those cases, which assessed the question of an unavailable forum. Beyond this context, it is difficult to extract a general principle for application. In Green, Judge Easterbrook highlighted this challenge as a practical matter for judicial determination
and asked “[h]ow could a district judge tell what is ‘integral’ without
65
66
67
68
69
70

Parnell v. Cashcall, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042–43.
Id. at 1044.
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a trial at which parties testify about what was important to them and
lawyers present data about questions such as whether consumers or
businesses shifted from arbitration to litigation when the Forum
stopped accepting new consumer disputes for resolution?”71 Absent
such an inquiry, the analysis may be reduced little more than a parody of Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity—“I know it when I
see it.”72
Second, the court’s distinction of Brown in Inetianbor may elevate form over substance, especially in light of the hasty manner in
which arbitration agreements frequently are negotiated and
drafted.73 For example, a provision calling for “arbitration under the
rules of” an institution which does not exist would be enforceable,
but a provision providing for “arbitration by” the same non-existent
institution would not be enforceable. Under the court’s stated approach, the latter would be an integral provision, but the former
would not.74
Such decisions have serious and long-reaching consequences.
Parm and Inetianbor highlight two frequent challenges when drafting arbitration agreements. First, parties commonly utilize templates
for dispute resolution agreements. As a result, when an arbitration
agreement suffers from some pathology that renders it unenforceable, the problem risks cascading when that agreement, or substantially similar agreements, have been used repeatedly in numerous
contracts. Consider, for example, that in 2018, the Third Circuit
heard a challenge to an arbitration agreement nearly identical to
those at issue in Parm (2016) and Inetianbor (2014).75 This is the
consequence of the repeated use of a single defective arbitration
agreement. Second, and compounding the first point above, parties
draft agreements long before disputes arise and, as a consequence,
sometimes face new legal developments that make established

71

Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., 724 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
73
See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014).
74
See id. at 1351–53.
75
MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2018). See also
Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., 835 F.3d 1331, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2016); Inetianbor,
768 F.3d at 1346.
72

2020]

A CURE FOR EVERY ILL?

1123

arbitration agreements unenforceable.76 As a consequence, parties
must be cautious not only to thoroughly vet their draft arbitration
agreements, but should also be as attentive as possible to legal developments that might render their arbitration agreements unenforceable in the future.

See, e.g., Parm, 835 F.3d at 1337 (noting that “the agreement in [Parm]
was executed more than four months before even the district court held that the
agreement in the Inetianbor case was void”).
76

